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Abstract
We analyze the impact of a natural experiment in Indonesia that allocated certain district
governments with a windfall revenue from natural resource production. Our identication is
based on a comparison between bordering districts in provinces that received the windfall with
those that did not receive it, before and after the scal reform in 1999. We study the impact
on a range of outcome variables such as regional GDP, infrastructure quality, employment,
education, and household consumption. Our results demonstrate a "ypaper e¤ect" in the
sense that the increased revenue led to higher spending without any lowering of local taxes.
We argue that the large relative increases in spending on public services contributed to a
very strong increase in local GDP levels, led by the agricultural sector. A 100-dollar windfall
further increased literacy by about 2 percent and non-food consumption by 67 USD. The strong
general tendency of positive e¤ects from the reform stands in contrast to the negative e¤ects
emphasized in the resource curse literature.
Keywords: Resource windfalls, scal decentralization, Indonesia
JEL Codes: H72, O20, Q33
1 Introduction
What is the impact of government revenue shocks in developing countries? What types of public
spending will have the greatest e¤ects in terms of economic growth and social welfare? Answers
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to these central policy questions are typically hard to obtain due to the di¢ culty of carrying out
policy experiments on a macro level. At the same time, we know from past policy failures (such as
the debt crises in the 1970-80s or the mismanagement of oil rents in Africa) that avoiding policy
mistakes is essential for achieving economic development.
In this paper, we present an extensive analysis of a natural experiment in a developing country
that provided certain local governments with an unexpected and sizeable windfall revenue. More
specically, we track the impact of policy change in Indonesia, initiated shortly after the dramatic
resignation of president Suharto in 1998, that re-allocated part of Indonesias resource revenues (oil
and gas) from the federal government to resource-producing provinces. The reform introduced a
new rule whereby all districts in resource producing provinces were to obtain a percentage of the
natural resource revenues collected by the central government. The reform also decentralized the
responsibility for the provision of public goods to local governments. Our analysis tracks the e¤ect
of the resource windfalls over time from the highest federal level via levels of district revenues,
spending and GDP, through the actual reported provision of public goods like roads and schools,
down to observed educational, labor market and consumption outcomes on household and invividual
level.
Our identication strategy in the empirical analysis is to compare local government behavior
in districts that received the resource windfalls with outcomes in neighboring districts across the
border that did not receive the windfall, before and after the reform. The rst category makes up
our "treatment group" whereas the second category is our "control" group. Our analysis suggests
that the districts on either side of the province borders are very similar geographically and culturally
and that the quasi-random assignment of the windfall on one side makes our study close to a natural
experiment. The districts in the sample are all located on two of the most resource-rich islands in
the country; Sumatra and the Indonesian part of Borneo (referred to as Kalimantan). Our data
allows us to study government revenues, expenditures, regional GDP and public goods outcomes
on district level during 19952011 and on household level between 2001-2009.
The results of our analysis show the following: i) There is clear evidence of a "ypaper e¤ect" in
the sense that all of the resource windfall appears to have stuck with the local government without
accompanying decreases in local taxation. Given a 100-dollar revenue windfall per capita (roughly
equivalent to the mean level of extra resource revenue in treatment districts after the reform),
total district expenditure increased by 67 USD in the following year. ii) The extra revenue was
mainly spent on education, infrastructure and on sta¤. iii) The windfall led to a very large relative
increase in non-oil regional GDP by a factor of 2.7, which in turn was led by the output boost in the
agricultural sector. iv) The increased spending on education resulted in more primary and junior
high schools on village level and led to generally higher school enrollment and completion rates on
household level. A 100-dollar windfall increased literacy among children aged 6-15 by 2 percent
and years of schooling by 0.14 years. v) Whereas the impact of the windfalls on employment and
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hours worked were not signicant, household expenditure on non-food consumption increased by 67
USD in districts that received a 100-dollar windfall. In summary, our analysis indicate a relatively
strong impact of the reform.
The theoretical framework in the paper suggests a number of interpretations of these results.
Our model proposes that increased public services such as education and infrastructure should
increase labor productivity with a lag, which in turn explains the rise in GDP a few years after
each windfall. The boost in the agricultural sector might be explained by an improvement in road
infrastructure. Labor productivity increases should also have resulted in higher wages, which in
turn might explain the very strong increase in household expenditure. A notable feature of these
results is the consistent non-negative results of the new policy, which suggests that the reform
escaped most of the previously observed problems, such as corruption or crowding-out e¤ects, that
have been described in the literature on the curse of natural resources.
Our work is related to several di¤erent research traditions. First, our paper is connected to a very
large literature on various aspects of scal policy such as the pros and cons of scal decentralization.1
Perhaps more importantly, our work contributes to a recent and growing research agenda where
researchers exploit natural experiments in order to establish causal e¤ects in macroeconomics.2 For
instance, Nakamura and Steinson (2014) use unpredictable national military spending in the US
as an instrument for local government spending and nd a local scal multiplier on GDP growth
to be about 1.5. Using a sample of 102 developing countries, Kraay (2014) exploits the exogenous
variation in government spending caused by the long lags involved in lending from o¢ cial creditors
to governments. Such multi-year spending plans are arguably uncorrelated to growth shocks in
subsequent years. Kraay nds that the one-year scal multiplier is about 0.4 percent. Whereas
these papers are primarily concerned with the estimation of multipliers for government spending on
GDP growth, our approach includes a more disaggregated analysis of how spending and economic
growth lter down to household level outcomes.
Our study is also related to research on the "ypaper e¤ect", referring to the phenomenon that
an extra unconditional grant from the government leads to more public spending than an equivalent
sum of extra citizen income.3 Such a "crowding-in" e¤ect, which are not borne out by standard
theoretical models, has for instance been observed in Sweden where Dahlberg et al (2008) nd that
block grants from central government results in a 1:1 increase in local spending, whereas taxes are
left unaltered. The result in our study that spending increases by 67 USD for every 100 of windfall,
is clearly lower than in Sweden but shows the same pattern of no e¤ect on local taxes. Gordon
1 In order to assess whether scal decentralization is associated with improved economic outcomes, some studies
use cross-regional variation within large countries such as United States (Akai and Sakata, 2008) or China (Zhang
and Zou, 2008). Our paper is closest to Skouas et als (2011) analysis of the recent reform towards direct elections
in districts in Indonesia, showing that the electoral reforms had a positive impact on public goods spending. Unlike
their study, our treatment is resource windfalls rather than the introduction of direct elections.
2See Fuchs-Schuendeln and Hassan (2015) for an overview of this literature.
3See Hines and Thaler (1995) and Inman (2008) for overviews.
3
(2004) shows that intergovernmental transfers increase educational spending in the United States
whereas a recent paper by Lundqvist et al (2014) nd no e¤ect of the same type of grant on local
employment.
Second, our research also links up with the extensive literature on the so called "resource curse"
in developing countries.4 As discussed by Collier (2007), Dalgaard and Olsson (2008) and others,
inows of resource revenues have often led to rent seeking, patronage politics, and corruption to
such an extent that the net growth e¤ect is often negative. The question how developing countries
should best handle their booming natural resource revenues has high policy relevance and there is
no general agreement on what type of policy that resource-rich countries should choose.
The policy chosen by Indonesia in 1999 was to decentralize resource revenue from the central
level of government to a regional or local level. Apart from Indonesia, Brazil has also chosen to
pursue a policy of oil revenue decentralization. The Brazilian experience has been the subject of
numerous studies. Litschig and Morrison (2013) is perhaps the study that is closest to ours. The
authors exploit a discontinuity in the level of grants from central to local governments in 1982-
85, based on municipal population levels, to identify the e¤ect of extra revenue on public service
provision. They nd that local government spending increased by about 20 percent, schooling years
increased by 0.3 years, literacy increased by about 4 percent and poverty was reduced.
Also using data on Brazilian municipalities, Monteiro and Ferraz (2010) show that extra oil
revenue appears to have led to an increase in the number of public employees but not to the
provision of public services like health and education. Their main focus is on political economy
aspects and their analysis demonstrates that the windfall created a large incumbency advantage
in local elections. Brollo et al (2013) use a regression discontinuity design and provide evidence
that larger oil windfalls increase corruption and lower the quality of political candidates on the
local level.5 Both Brollo et al (2013) and Caselli and Michaels (2013) recognize that municipalities
with oil revenues have increased their spending, but like Monteiro and Ferraz (2010), these studies
emphasize that the increased spending has not improved public services as much as one would have
expected. Caselli and Michaels (2013) further show that oil windfalls are associated with illegal
activities by mayors, suggesting an increase in corrupt behaviors.
Our paper obviously makes a contribution by having a di¤erent and, for this purpose, a novel
object of study; Indonesia. Unlike most of the studies above (with the exception of Caselli and
Michaels, 2013), we investigate the impact of the windfall on district level GDP. We further follow
a longer chain of impacts from federal grants down to household level outcomes. In addition, as
far as we know, our paper is the rst study in this literature to use a border between a producing
and a non-producing province as our forcing variable and exploit the time variation in public goods
4See van der Ploeg (2011) for an overview of this large literature. Several recent studies question if there has
really been any resource curse during the last decade.
5See also Vicente (2010) who compares outcomes in Sao Tome and Principe with Cape Verde as a "control
country".
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outcomes. The methodology that we employ is most similar to an otherwise unrelated study by Dell
(2010) who also uses a border as a forcing variable in a historical analysis of the long-run legacy of
a colonial institution in Peru.
Third, our quasi-experimental approach is related to the large literature on randomized control
trials in developing countries (see for instance Duo et al, 2007). In recent research, it has often
been emphasized that an upscaling of micro eld experiments is a natural direction for future
work (Bold et al, 2013). The current paper might be seen as an attempt to contribute to this
agenda. Our paper adds to the ndings of Duo (2001, 2004) who investigated the consequences
of a major primary school construction program in Indonesia in 1974-78 on schooling and labor
market outcomes. Furthermore, our approach is related to that of Reinikka and Svensson (2004)
who study the extent to which a new grant from the Ugandan government actually reached 250
schools. In a similar spirit, we combine data on grants from a central government with district,
village, and household level data on educational spending and observed schooling outcomes.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a theoretical framework for understanding
the impact of a resource windfall on spending decisions, public good provision, GDP levels, and
household consumption. Section 3 outlines the context of the empirical study and section 4 discusses
the data and identication strategy. The main results are presented in section 5 and are discussed
in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section, we provide a simple framework for analyzing the behavior of a local government in
response to a revenue shock. We will start with a very simple model where we assume a represen-
tative individual getting utility from a single private and a single public good. We then expand
the model to two public goods and two periods and a lifetime budget constraint. The rst section
analyzes the ypaper e¤ect, the second and third considers the impact of a windfall gain on public
goods provision, whereas sections 2.4-2.6 analyze the impact on regional GDP, labor markets, and
household consumption. The main purpose of the model is to serve as a simple framework for our
interpretation of the empirical analysis.
2.1 The ypaper e¤ect
Imagine a local government that is run by a representative (median) voter who gets utility U from
the consumption of private goods c and from publicly provided goods g such that U (c; g).6 For
instance, we might think of c as food and g as an individuals benets from a school.7 For now, let
6The analysis in this section builds on Inman (2008).
7For now, we assume that the publicly provided goods below are private goods by nature, i.e. rival and excludable.
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us assume a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function: U (c; g) =  ln c+ (1  ) ln g where  > 0 is
the relative preference for private consumption.
Let us further make the simplifying assumption that in this community, the consumption of
food and school services is nanced by the pooled resources from private income w and lump-sum
per capita grants b > 0 from a higher-level government such that pc + g  w + b where p is the
relative price of private consumption. Part of the private income w might thus be used for schools
and part of the lump-sum grants might be used for private consumption.
It is then easily shown that the demand functions for the two goods will be gd = (1  ) (w + b)
and cd =  (w + b) =p. What is the impact on the demand for schools of an unexpected windfall
increase in government grants by one unit b = 1? The simple answer is8
@gd
@b
b = 1  :
It is thus immediately clear that @g
d
@b b < 1. In other words, a windfall increase in government
grants will increase the consumption of schooling but not by the full amount of the windfall. Since
the median voter also values private consumption in the form of food, part of the windfall will be
spent on food, i.e. on private goods. The exact magnitude of the impact depends only on the
relative preference for schooling 1  .
Note also that the source of the extra income, b or w, does not matter for the outcome. One unit
increase in government grants b = 1 will have exactly the same e¤ect as an equivalent increase in
private income w = 1; @g
d
@w w = (1  ).
As discussed by Inman (2008) and others, many studies have shown that this theoretical pre-
diction does not hold empirically. More specically, empirical studies have shown that @g
d
@b >
@gd
@w ,
i.e. an increase in government grants typically results in politicians reacting with a much greater
increase in public services than if the windfall had originated from private income. Some studies
have even found extreme results such that @g
d
@b b = 1 (for instance Dahlberg et al, 2008). In this
sense, it appears that money "sticks where it hits" so that windfalls in government grants mainly
lead to increases in publicly provided services whereas windfalls in private income mainly lead to
increases in private consumption. In the empirical section, we will investigate whether this anomaly
prevails also in our Indonesian sample.
2.2 An extended model
Let us now consider the impact of a government windfall when there are more than one public
good and when we have an overlapping generation, two-period setting with a current (t = 0) and
a future period (t = 1). For simplicity, let us imagine that are only two publicly provided goods,
8The symbol  henceforth refers to the change in the level of a variable from one period to the next.
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schools (S ) and roads (R) with quantities xSt; xRt  0 at t 2 f0; 1g. Let us assume that the utility
function of the median voter who runs the local government is given by a general function
U = u(c0; xS0; xR0) + u(c1; xS1; xR1)
where, for instance, xS1 refers to the quantity of schools in the future period 1 and where  < 1 is
a time discount rate. The utility function u() is increasing and concave in all its arguments.
Food and public services are purchased in an open market where the representative individual
is a price taker. The local budget constraint is given by
1X
t=0
(pct + pSxSt + pRxRt) 
1X
t=0
(wt + bt(1  z)) = m
where wt is private income at time t, p is the price of food, pg is the price of public service g 2 fS;Rg,
b is the level of grants received from the federal government as before, and z is the share of grants
that disappear as a result of unproductive government activities, sloppy book-keeping or direct
capture by local politicians. The level of z might be thought of as reecting the general quality
of government. Prices do not change over time. For simplicity, we abstract from other sources of
tax income for the median voter in charge, as well as from private capital and interest rates. Note
that the budget constraint implies that total "lifetime" expenditures over the two periods on the
left hand side must not exceed total revenue m on the right.9
The aggregate production function in the economy is yt = f(Lt; xSt 1; xRt 1) where marginal
products are fLt() > 0, fxSt 1() > 0, fxRt 1 > 0. We assume that production in period t is
a function of total labor input in the same period Lt and on investments in schools and roads
one period prior to the current one. Labor is paid its marginal product so that wt = fLt() > 0.
The generation that is young in period 0 passively inherits the schools and roads provided by the
old generation; w0 = fL0(L0; xS 1; xR 1). We further assume that the marginal product of labor
typically increases with xSt 1 and xRt 1 so that fLt;xSt 1()  0 and fLt;xRt 1()  0.
Combining the functions above gives a standard optimization problem:
  = u(c0; xS0; xR0) + u(c1; xS1; xR1) + (1)
+ [w0 + fL1(L1; xS0; xR0) + (b0 + b1) (1  z)  p (c0 + c1)  pS (xS0 + xS1)  pR (xR0 + xR1)] :
As usual,  is a Lagrangean multiplier. The representative individual gets a direct utility from
consumption, schools, and roads in both periods. Note also that the intertemporal spillover, arising
9This might be too exible compared to reality where local governments often have to balance revenues and
expenditures every time period.
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from the fact that w1 = fL1(L1; xS0; xR0); implies that public good investments xS0 and xR0 in the
initial period also have an indirect utility e¤ect by boosting labor incomes and hence the existing
resources in period 1:
In the sections below, we will not derive explicit solutions to the standard model above but
only use it to discuss general points. The rst-order conditions on the basis of the optimization
problem in (1) can be used to dene demand functions for the public goods in the standard way:
xdgt(p; pS ; pR;m). We denote the supply of schools by x
s
S . Supply is assumed to be perfectly elastic
to start with so that entrepreneurs can supply any quantity that the local government demand at a
xed price. The same assumption applies for roads (R). Below, we will also discuss the implications
of a more inelastic supply curve.
Let us assume that we are initially in equilibrium where supply equals demand (xsSt = x
d
St(p; pS ; pR;m) =
xSt) when an unexpected windfall grant of size b is handed out by the national government. Will
this lead to an increase in the equilibrium level of school facilities and, if so, by how much?
2.3 Impact of a revenue windfall
A key comparative static for the empirical section concerns the impact of a revenue windfall on the
equilibrium level of public services, i.e. the impact of an increase b on xS or x

R. To start
with, it is of course very important to understand the temporal character of the windfall. Does
it lead to an increase in b0 as well as in b1 or do people only believe it is a temporary gain that
will be withdrawn (so that b0 > 0 is matched by an o¤setting decrease in b1? In the latter case,
the intertemporal budget constraint m will be una¤ected and the forward-looking representative
individual will not change her demand. We will henceforth assume that the representative individual
recognizes that the positive change in windfalls is a change in long-run policy and is thus permanent.
From the intertemporal budget constraint m, it is clear that the impact of an increase in b will
depend importantly on the general competence and honesty of the local government as captured by
z. If z is high, then much of the extra money will be wasted or embezzled which implies a generally
low xg. Second, the relative preference for schools as compared to roads should matter for the
relative impact xS=x

R. This is well in line with intuition.
Third, to what extent does the provision of schools depend on prices pS and pR? Typically,
when schools and roads are substitutes, a relatively high price pS=pR should be associated with a
relatively low marginal increase in schools, even if preferences for schools might be as strong as for
roads. Analogously, an increase in pR should lead to a substitution e¤ect such that xS becomes
higher. If, however, schools and roads are complements, then a higher pR might lead to a somewhat
lower provision of schools.
In the setting above, the prices are set by producers and do not respond to government revenue
windfalls from outside. Clearly, one could think of situations when a windfall gives rise to increases
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in p; pS and pR or just in one of them, i.e. more inelastic supply curves. In an isolated village,
there might for instance only be a single supplier of tarmac for road construction. In such cases, a
general increase in the price level should imply a lower provision of public goods in response to a
windfall. In the extreme case of a perfectly inelastic supply curve, the only result of a windfall will
be a spike in local prices.
What if schools can only be provided in a "lumpy" fashion so that one extra unit can only
come in discrete amounts whereas roads can be increased in a continuous fashion? In that case,
if the resource windfall is b < pS  minxS where minxS is the minimum feasible level of a
school investment, there cannot be a new school. Instead, the local government will have to spend
the money on more roads. Hence, even if there is a political preference for investments in larger
discrete public goods like new schools, these might not materialize due to the specic character of
the required investment.
The model further abstracts from regulations such as a law stating that there has to be a school
or a health clinic in every village. In any case, such public services should be the rst to be put in
place and should not be very responsive to unexpected windfall gains.
In summary, the simple framework illustrates how the marginal impact of a revenue windfall
on the equilibrium level of a particular publicly provided good like schools will critically depend on
the general competence and honesty of the local government, on the weight of political preferences
for the particular good, on the relative price, on the price elasticity of supply, on the level of
complementarity with other public goods, on the minimum feasible unit of investment of the good
in question, and on regulations regarding mandatory public goods.
2.4 Regional GDP
How does the provision of public services a¤ect aggregate measures of the regional economy, such
as the gross regional domestic product (GRDP)? We assumed above that yt = f(Lt; xSt 1; xRt 1).
For instance, investments in infrastructure should mainly improve productivity only after a while,
when people and markets have adjusted to the new conditions. Educational investments probably
take an even longer time to have an e¤ect on productivity.
Let us dene economic growth in period t + 1 as yt+1 = yt+1   yt = f(Lt+1; xSt; xRt)  
f(Lt; xSt 1; xRt 1). The expression makes it clear that growth will be determined mainly by the
changes in the equilibrium levels of public goods xSt and x

Rt.
10
In order to analyze the growth response to a windfall gain, it is rst necessary to consider the
rst-order condition of the intertemporal optimization problem above. The comparative static on
10The eveolution of Lt is exogenous in this framework.
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the basis of (1) tells us that
@ 
@xs0
= uxS0() +  (fL1xs0()  pS) = 0:
An increase in schools thus has both a direct e¤ect and an indirect e¤ect. The direct e¤ect,
captured by the marginal utility uxS0(), arises from the fact that the representative individual will
increase her demand of schools in period 0 because she enjoys to consume that good per se. The
indirect e¤ect arises from the fact that an increase in xs0 also leads to a marginal increase in labor
productivity and in wages earned in period 1 (fL1xs0() = @w1=@xs0 > 0) and thus boosts the
lifetime budget m.
Hence, the impact of a windfall gain b on xg0 and on economic growth should depend on:
(i) The strength of its impact on marginal utility in period 0 (uxg0()) and (ii) the strength of its
impact on the marginal sensitivity of future labor productivity to current public good increases
(fL1xg0()): If the latter link to productivity is weak, then the individual will rationally choose less
public goods and growth will be slower.
As a natural consequence of our assumption about the production function f(Lt; xSt 1; xRt 1),
a windfall gain in period 0 will only have an e¤ect on income and growth in period 1. We will test
this simple conjecture in the empirical section (using GDP per capita as a proxy).
2.5 Labor market
We assumed above that wages were equal to the marginal product of labor: wt = fLt(Lt; xSt 1; xRt 1).
The straightforward insight from this standard expression is that an increase in public services at
t   1 should increase wages one period later at time t. However, in our data, we do not observe
wages. What we do observe is whether people work and the number of hours people work. These
outcomes arguably reect an equilibrium between labor demand and labor supply.
Labor demand is implicity dened by the wage equation above such that Ldt (wt; xSt 1; xRt 1).
Since we know from above that the marginal product of labor fLt increases with public goods xgt 1,
then it must be the case that @Ldt =@xgt 1 > 0, i.e. demand for labor increases one period after the
windfall gain.
The labor market clears when labor demand equals labor supply: Ldt = L
s
t = L

t . What typically
happens with labor supply Ls after a windfall revenue shock is less clear.11 In case of a positively
sloped labor supply curve (@Lst (wt) =@wt > 0 at all wt > 0), both wages and the employment
of labor in the economy will increase. If the supply curve is backward-bending at higher wages
11 In a richer model, we might have explicitly derived labor supply by including leisure in a representative individ-
uals utility function and a tradeo¤ between leisure and earning money for consumption. We leave out this standard
step for space considerations.
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(@Lst (wt) =@wt < 0 at wt > w), then although labor demand and wages increase as a result of the
windfall, labor supply might actually fall, resulting in a similar or even a lower equilibrium level of
total hours worked.
One might also imagine that labor supply is xed in the short run at some Ls = L. In that case,
the rise in productivity would not raise hours worked but have an even more pronounced e¤ect on
wages. We will return also to this issue in the empirical analysis.
2.6 Household consumption
Total lifetime household income is, as specied above, given by m =
P1
t=0 (wt + bt(1  z)). A
permanent boost in federal government grants b0 and b1 should thus increase consumption of all
goods in period 0 as well as in period 1. An underlying assumption here is of course that credit
markets work well so that individuals are able to smooth their consumption over the life cycle.
Since we know that credit markets typically are far from perfect in developing countries, we might
instead expect a "Keynesian" increase in overall short-run expenditure so that people spend while
they have cash on hand. We investigate this issue in the empirical section.
Another consideration concerns the impact of the time discount rate . If  is low so that people
discount the future heavily, then the immediate increase in consumption should be relatively large
after a windfall. Furthermore, in a mid-income country like Indonesia where people are not typically
undernourished, we would expect the revenue shock to primarily increase the private consumption
of non-food items.
3 The Indonesian Context
In this section, we briey outline the Indonesian context for the empirical study.
3.1 The 1999 Fiscal Decentralization Reform
The Indonesian administrative structure is composed of di¤erent levels: central government, provinces
(like US states), districts (US counties), sub-districts and villages. During the 1966-1998 autocratic
regime, most of the power was retained by the central government. After the fall of Suharto, the
government undertook a massive decentralization process and redistributed a large part of this
power to districts and some to provinces. The transfer of authority concerned all elds other than
macro-policies12 : public works, health, education and culture, agriculture, transportation, industry
and trade, investment, environment, land, cooperatives, and labor (art 11.2).13 The reform became
12Macro policies include foreign relations, defense, justice, monetary, scal and religious policies.
13 It is di¢ cult to nd additional details on these responsibilities. About education: since 1994 education is
mandatory until the 9th grade, therefore districts are particularly responsible for primary and junior-high education.
It is not clear how provinces and districts share the responsibility for school building and for hiring and paying
11
law in November 1999 and came into power simultaneously across all Indonesian districts in January
2001.14
Laws 22/1999 and 25/1999 regulate the sources of local revenue. They consist of: Own income
(local taxes and fees, returns from regional-owned enterprises), revenue sharing (local share of taxes,
local share of revenues from natural resources) and grants (transfers from the central government).
The greatest part of local revenue used to come from transfers from the central government in
the pre-decentralization period (called SDO) and continues to be so even after decentralization
(DAU and DAK). Among the other sources of income, one was deeply a¤ected by the reform
and constitutes the focus of this paper: the redistribution of revenues from natural resources.
Natural resources are oil, natural gas, mining, forestry and shing. While state income from
shing was redistributed equally across all districts, the revenues from all the other resources were
redistributed according to location. Table 1 shows the exact shares which went to central and
regional governments (art. 6 of Law 25/1999).
Following decentralization, the central government retained a lower percentage of the natural
resource tax revenues, while resource-abundant districts retained a greater percentage. Resource-
abundant districts (henceforth: producing districts) were not the only beneciaries of this re-
allocation. The scal decentralization law states also that non-producing districts within producing
provinces are entitled to a share of natural resource tax revenues. This share varies depending on
the type of natural resource (see Table 1). Although it is relatively high for forestry and mining
and low for oil and gas, the latter are a lot more valuable. Therefore, this legislative change seems
to benet mainly the non-producing districts within oil and gasprovinces.
Table 1
A noteworthy feature of the revenue sharing originating from natural resources is that the law
does not specify how the receiving districts should spend these additional revenues, i.e. there are
no obligations attached to them.
3.2 Study areas: Sumatra and Kalimantan
The two areas that we study in this paper are Sumatra and the Indonesian part of Borneo (Kali-
mantan). There are several oil and gas producing provinces in Indonesia. However, only few of them
produce a quantity of oil and gas that qualies transfers to non-producing districts located within
teachers. About infrastructures: districts are not directly responsible for electricity provision because that is typically
provided by a State-owned enterprise (PLN); they are directly responsible for water provision because that is typically
provided by local branches of the water utilities (PDAM). About roads: the central government is directly responsible
for highways; provinces are directly responsible for roads crossing more than one district; districts are directly
responsible for all the others.
14See Fadliya and McLeod (2010) for a broader discussion about the new policy.
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the same province greater than 5 percent of their district budget. These provinces are located in
Sumatra and Kalimantan.
Figure 1 shows the parts of Sumatra that are included in our study. The most central province,
called Riau (or Rumbai), has received substantial new revenues from natural resources after the
recent reform and so has the province of South Sumatra. Also a northern province, Aceh (not
shown), receives large ows of rents. However, this province has for a long time sought independence
from Indonesia and has been plagued by civil strife. Aceh is also one of the provinces that was
hardest hit by the 2004 tsunami, just like all the provinces with shores along the Sumatran west
coast.15 In order to avoid these confounding e¤ects, our main analysis will exclusively focus on
the provinces Riau and South Sumatra as treatment regions and its neighboring districts in North
Sumatra in the northwest and Jambi in the south as control regions. The dotted lines in Figure 1
specify more exactly the borders that we focus on. In the empirical section, we will use data from
districts with a centroid that is within 120 km from the border on each side.
Figure 1
As is well known, spatial regression discontinuity designs require all determinants of the outcome
of interest, except the treatment variable, to change smoothly at the border. One potential threat to
this strategy is that the province border was drawn in correspondence of geographic or socioeconomic
cleavages which are themselves correlated with the outcomes of interest (see for instance Dell,
2010). Figure 1 provides a basic overview of the geography of our treatment and control areas. The
gure shows that there are no obvious discontinuities along the border in terms of terrain. Jambi,
located in between the two treament areas, has a very similar lowland geography to Riau and South
Sumatra, whereas North Sumatra has lowland plains close to the border but also mountains in the
west. In the empirical section, we discuss further how we exclude mountain villages in order to
check robustness.
The province Riau is located by the Strait of Malacca and has the Singapore and Kuala Lumpur
metropolitan areas as neighbors across the strait. Riau province has currently about 5.5 million
inhabitants and has experienced a steady growth of population and of its economy since the 1970s,
largely due to natural resource exploitation. South Sumatras population is about 7.4 million. The
capital city, Palembang, hosts about 1.5 million of the provinces inhabitants. Jambis population
is about 3 million whereas North Sumatras is about 12 million, according to the 2010 census.
Population density on the island as a whole is just below 100 people per km2: In the four provinces
in our study, population density is fairly evenly distributed except for coastal North Sumatra which
has a higher population density than the other areas. Malay is the main language spoken in Riau
and other dialects of the same family are also the main tongue in Jambi and in South Sumatra.
15The big tsunami in december 2004 had its epicenter in the Indian Ocean right west of Aceh. Hence, Aceh and
the provinces on the western coast of Sumatra were a¤ected but not the eastern coasts.
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In the interior of North Sumatra, languages of a somewhat di¤erent family dominate (Ethnologue,
2012).16
The current situation in the four provinces has of course been heavily inuenced by general
historical developments on Sumatra. A key turning point in the history of Sumatra was the Por-
tuguese arrival and conquest of Malacca across the strait in 1511, which had until then dominated
central Sumatra. From about the 16th century, Aceh was the dominant indigenous political unit
on the island and acted together with the Dutch East India Company (VOC) to expulse the Por-
tuguese from Malacca in 1641. Aceh then resisted the increasing Dutch inuence until the Aceh
War 1873-1903. Trade was always a central part of the Sumatran economy, in particular during the
Dutch East Indies-era when Dutch traders dominated the spice trade. In 1945, Sumatra became
part of newly independent Indonesia (Ricklefs, 2008).
We also investigate the impact of resource windfalls within four provinces of central-eastern
Kalimantan (see Figure 2), the other major oil-producing region in the country. Kalimantan is
made up of the Indonesian parts of Borneo. Before the colonial period, the southern parts of
Kalimantan that make up our control area, belonged to the Banjar sultanate (1526-1860). The
Dutch colonial power increased its presence in the 19th century from their bases on Java but the
current Indonesian borders of the Dutch colony were not established until in the early 20th century.
Colonial e¤orts were somewhat greater in the southern part of the island than in the eastern part
where most of current oil resources are located. Kalimantan was always considered a peripheral
part of the colony. Like Sumatra, Kalimantan became part of independent Indonesia in 1945.
Figure 2
Kalimantan province split into three provinces in 1956; West, South, and East. The following
year, South Kalimantan split into South and the geographically larger Central Kalimantan in order
to give the indigenous Dayak population of Central province greater autonomy from the Muslim
populations in South Kalimantan. Kalimantan hosts numerous ethnic groups of which the most
important language families are Malayic, Barito, Dayak, and North Borneo.17 A simplied descrip-
tion, Dayak groups dominate the interior whereas Muslim groups control the lands closer to the
coast.
In terms of natural resources, Kalimantan is perhaps the richest region in the country, whereas it
is relatively undeveloped economically (like most of the areas outside Java). In terms of population
density and the geographic dispersion of economic activity, Kalimantan is similar to the many
African countries currently experiencing a resource boom. Total population in 2010 is estimated to
be just below 14 million and population density is only 25 people per km2, which can be compared
with Sumatras 100 people per km2 and Javas equivalent gure of more than 1000 per km2:
16These language are Batak Mandailing, Batak Angkola, and Batak Toba.
17Data is from Ethnologue (2012). Kalimantan as a whole has 74 distinct languages.
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East Kalimantan is the only province where oil is produced whereas no oil is produced in South,
Central, and West Kalimantan. Our analysis focuses on the border area between East Kalimantan
and the other three provinces, as shown in Figure 2. Just like in Sumatra, the area that we consider
includes districts with a centroid at most 120 kms from the border. As is evident from Figure 2,
the terrain is not obviously di¤erent on either side of the border. On the contrary, the topography
is typically quite similar on both sides.
In terms of ethnicity, our investigations show that at least the southern and central parts of the
border cut right through the traditional lands of ethnic groups within the Barito language family.18
The logic of the current drawing of province borders is probably somewhat related to the historical
geographical extension of the Banjarmasin sultanate and the Dutch colonial rule during the 19th
century. However, all evidence points to that the border areas that we study were never clearly
demarcated either culturally, politically or geographically. Hence, they should constitute a suitable
study area for our analysis.
Figure 3 shows a more detailed map of the districts along the province borders on both islands
that are included in the study. The dark blue districts are treatment areas whereas light blue
districts are control units. In total, our main sample includes 49 districts.
Figure 3
4 Data and empirical strategy
4.1 Data
In this paper we make use of district, village level and household data. The rst type of data
that we use is district budget data collected annually by the Ministry of Finance. The data include
information on types of revenue and areas of expenditure. The revenue components include numbers
on natural resource related transfers that constitute our explanatory variable of interest. District
level data also exist for regional gross domestic product (GRDP) and for the supply of specic
public goods like road quality.
Our second type of data is village data taken from the census of Indonesian villages (PODES).
This is collected every three years by Indonesian Institute of Statistics (BPS). We make use of the
2002, 2005 and 2008 waves. The PODES data include details on the presence of primary, junior-high
and senior-high schools in villages.
The third type of data is household data taken from a large household survey called SUSENAS.
This is collected every year by BPS. We make use of all waves between 2001 and 2009. The SUSE-
NAS data include details at the individual level, like education, employment status and days/hours
worked and details at the household level, like total, food and non-food average consumption.
18See maps on Indonesia in Ethnologue (2012).
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4.2 Identication strategy
In the two sections below, we outline in detail the identication strategy and the econometric
specications for the district, village and household level analyses.
The legislative change in 1999 is the key exogenous intervention that we study in this paper.
The change in policy generated automatically two groups: districts located in producing provinces
and districts located in non-producing provinces. Below we check whether districts belonging to
the rst group have experienced a signicant increase in the revenue associated with oil and gas
transfers.
We rst apply a straightforward Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence (DD) strategy exploiting data before
and after the policy change. Since we have the precise georeferenced location of all the districts
in the sample, we push the identication strategy one step further by restricting our analysis to
districts within 120 kilometers from the closest border. We aggregate the observations from Sumatra
and Kalimantan into one sample of 49 districts (not all of which had available info on district level
in 2000). The main sample includes 15 treated districts and 34 control districts. Table 2A-2B show
the descriptive statistics.
Table 2A: Descriptive statistics (district level) of control and treatment districts
Table 2B: Descriptive statistics (village, household and individual level) of control and treatment
districts
Table 2A displays the statistics for control and treatment districts before and after the reform.
Ideally, we would of course like to see balanced pre-treatment subsamples. On the revenue side in
A), we see that the two types of districts are quite similar before the reform whereas government
expenditure in B) is markedly higher in control districts.
The disaggregated data on local GDP in C) shows that the control and treatment districts are
quite dissimilar. Control districts are substantially poorer pre-reform than treatment districts, even
when excluding oil and gas (593 vs 925 USD per capita). These di¤erences are most likely due to
the fact that treatment districts belonged to provinces where oil had been extracted for decades
before the reform. This heterogeneity should be kept in mind when interpreting the results for
GDP. Road quality in D), on the other hand, seems to be better in control districts before the
reform.
Table 2B shows the descriptive statistics on village, individual and household level for di¤erent
variables during the reform period.
Within our restricted sample, we also use a continuous measure of the resource windfall in order
to assess the more exact impact of a marginal increase in revenue. Figure 4 shows the distribution of
resource revenues across treatment and control districts. Most control districts receive zero resource
revenues but some control districts receive small amounts. These amounts are mainly revenues from
other natural resources than oil and gas.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Resource Revenues across treatment and control districts
4.3 Econometric specication
We estimate two main equations. The rst is a straightforward Di¤erence-in-di¤erence regression
with a binary treatment variable for districts in provinces that benetted from the windfall after
the 1999 legislative change:
ydrt = d+
2000X
t=1995
0t (TREATd  Y EARt)+
2011X
t=2001
1t (TREATd  Y EARt)+ISLANDrY EARt+"drt;
(2)
where ydrt is the (linear or logged) outcome in district d; island r at time t, d is a district xed e¤ect,
TREATd is a binary indicator for whether the district received the extra windfall (TREATd = 1) or
not (TREATd = 0) after 1999, ISLANDr is an island dummy for either Sumatra or Kalimantan,
Y EARt is the year xed e¤ect, and "drt is the error term clustered at the district level. Island-year
xed e¤ects are captured by the coe¢ cient for the interaction term ISLANDr  Y EARt.
Our outcomes of interest ydrt measure the district-year amounts of government revenues, expen-
ditures, and GRDP. Our treatment variable TREATd is interacted with Y EARt before and after
the policy change in 1999. Obviously, if our empirial design is justied, we expect 0t = 0 and
non-signicant. In this sense, the estimates for 0t might be regarded as falsication tests. The key
parameters of interest are 1t. These coe¢ cients should capture the true impact of the resource
windfall on our outcome variables as long as there are no systematic di¤erences between treat-
ment and control districts (other than the resource windfall) that vary over time and are correlated
with ydrt (identication assumption). If 1t > 0, this means that treated districts experienced a
greater increase in public revenue, expenditure, and GRDP after the legislative change than control
districts.
Our second main specication allows for analyzing more closely the dynamics of the impact of
the resource windfall. The equation is now
ydrt = d+0REV ENUESdt+1REV ENUESdt 1+2REV ENUESdt 2+ISLANDrY EARt+drt:
(3)
Like before, ydrt is the outcome in district d; island r at time t, d is a district xed e¤ect and
ISLANDr  Y EARt estimates the island-specic time trend. The main variable of interest is now
the continuous treatment variable REV ENUESdt which measures the per capita resource revenues
in constant prices in units of 100 USD. The regression coe¢ cients 0; 1 and 2 measure the relative
impact of resources compared to control districts without any resource windfalls. The treatment
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variable is lagged up to two periods in order to highlight the dynamics of the impact. For instance,
as discussed in the theoretical section, our conjecture is that the impact of the windfall on GDP
and wages runs mainly through public services and labor productivity, which should imply a lagged
e¤ect on most outcomes of interest. Standard errors are clustered at district level.
When we switch to village and household level analysis in the later part of the empirical analysis,
we still use equation (3) as the basic format with the important di¤erence that the outcome variable
is yidrt for individual i in district d, on island r at time t. The treatment variable REV ENUESdt
is then still on district level.
5 Results
In this section, we track the resource windfalls through district government expenditure decisions,
down to education, employment and expenditure outcomes on individual level. First, we study how
district revenues and public good expenditures changed as a result of the scal decentralization
reform. The second part investigates the impact of the windfall on district level GDP. We then
move to household level analysis and investigate the impact of the windfall on education and
employment outcomes. Lastly, we study the impact on household expenditures.
5.1 District level
5.1.1 Total revenue and expenditure
The rst results concern district government revenues and expenditures. All budget measures are
per capita and in constant prices. Figure 5 shows a rst set of results, based upon the specication
in (2). The graph shows the point estimates for each year before and after the reform during
1995-2010. All revenue and expenditure measures are expressed in million IDR (i.e., 100 USD) for
convenience.
A very striking result is that, in 2001, revenues from natural resources in the upper left corner
increases drastically in the treated districts. The peak is reached in 2006, when treated districts
received about 120 USD per capita more than the control districts. The graph in the upper right
corner conrms that this resource windfall indeed drives the net relative gains in total revenues.
Figure 5
An equally striking nding in the lower left corner shows that the relative level of locally managed
taxes hardly changed at all after the reform. In other words, there are no signs that the treated
districts lowered taxes in response to the windfall. The increased revenues allowed treated districts
to boost expenditure signicantly from at least 2002, as seen in the lower right corner. During
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the period, the treated districts typically spent about 50 USD more per capita than non-treated
districts.
In Table 3, we use the specication in (3) where the windfall is a continuous measure that is
di¤erent even among treated districts. The sample has 332-361 district-year observations from the
post-reform period 2001-2010. Panel A shows the contemporaneous e¤ect e¤ect of the windfall
in the same year whereas panel B shows the dynamics including also a one- and a two-year lag.
Resource revenues are again expressed in units of 100 USD for convenience. Columns 1-4 show the
results from the linear specication and columns 5-8 the log-linear specications.
Table 3
Column 1 shows that a 100 USD ow of resource revenues leads to a contemporaneous increase
in total revenues of about 93 USD. This immediate increase is well in line with the tendency in
gure 5. However, total revenues are the sum of resource revenue, locally managed taxes and grants
from the federal governments.
Column 2 shows the e¤ect on grants (Panel A for the contemporaneous e¤ect; Panel B for the
lagged e¤ect). Grants are largely dominated by a set of unconditional grants called DAU (Dana
Alokasi Umum), which are allocated according to a formula, where resource revenues appear as
negative term.19 Importantly, these grants are allocated based on data dating back to one or two
years before. It is therefore not surprising that: i) the e¤ect of resource revenues on grants is
negative; ii) such negative e¤ect appears after two lags. The sum of the lagged e¤ects on grants
suggests a decrease of 23 USD (with a p-value lower than 0.01). Hence, the e¤ect of resource
revenues on grants seems to be second order relative to the direct e¤ect on total revenue. In
fact, the sum of the lagged e¤ects on total revenue (Column 1) is still positive, large (73 USD)
and precisely estimated. This demonstrates that the policy had a very substantial e¤ect on local
government revenue.
Column 3 shows the e¤ect on total expenditure. Panel B suggests that a windfall of 100 USD
increases expenditure by 67 USD one year after. The lagged response is consistent with the future
resource revenues are unknown, and therefore can only be incorporated in the budget after the
central government calculated them and distributed them. Since the level and composition of
district expenditure is planned throughout the previous year (Fadliya and McLeod 2010), their
e¤ect on expenditure appears one year after their reception.
Hence, during the year of windfall, the local government and the local parliament plan the budget
incorporating the resource windfall, as well as the partial compensation they expect in terms of
grants.20 The positive shock on total spending is positive and large, but not as large as the e¤ect
19The formula is meant to work as a mechanism to redistribute wealth from rich to poor districts. Besides resource
revenues, it is based on factors like population, Human Development Index, and local GDP.
20No regulation makes clear that such compensation takes place with an additional lag, so the local governments
might not know this and adjust their expenditure fully and immediately for such compensation.
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on total revenue: the local government actually planned to spend less than the shock because it
anticipates the grant reduction; one year later (two years from the resource windfall), the negative
shock on grants actually happens, but the estimates show that the total spending does not su¤er
from it. Numerically speaking, it is easy to check that the sum of all lags in total revenue (0.735)
closely matches the sum of the rst and second lag in total spending (0.672 + 0.095 = 0.767).
Column 4 shows the e¤ect on local revenue, i.e., revenue raised through locally managed taxes.
The estimates conrm once again the nding in gure 4 that the resource windfalls do not result
in lower taxes. At least in the short run, we thus seem to observe a strong ypaper e¤ect. The
resource windfall stuck at the district government.
5.1.2 Expenditure composition
How is then the increase in district revenues spent? Table 4 reveals the impact of the windfall on
expenditures disaggregated by function. As the means demonstrate, the four functions included
in the table together make up about 80 percent of total expenditures.21 Our discussion in the
theoretical section suggested that local governments should, for instance, spend on public services
that were complementary to each other like schools and roads. Column 2 suggests that a 100-dollar
resource windfall in t  1 leads to a relative increase in expenditure on education by about 10 USD
in the following year from a mean of about 38 USD. The equivalent net impact on infrastructure
is even stronger; about 30 USD from a mean of 36 USD. However, the estimates for infrastructure
are not signicant. Interestingly, the net impact of the windfall on administration and housing
expenditures are actually negative (although insignicant).
Table 4
Table 5 disaggregates district expenditure by category of public good. To start with, column 1
conrms the previous nding that expenditures appears to increase markedly in treated districts
one year after the windfall.22 The increase in sta¤ in column 2 is statistically signicant in panel
A and the sum of the lags are jointly signicant in panel B. From a mean of 60 USD per capita,
the sum of lags 0.157 implies that a 100-dollar windfall for the years t  1 and t  2 gives rise to a
relative increase in sta¤ expenditure by about 25 percent of the initial mean in year t. Capital is
the other major category, although the estimates are measured with less precision. In terms of our
theoretical discussion, one explanation for the results regarding sta¤ might be that personnel has
the advantage of being a type of expenditure that can be increased in a continuous fashion whereas
capital often requires lumpy investments.
Table 5
21The number is reached by summing all the means in columns 1-5 in panel B and then dividing by mean total
expenditure (1.577) in table 3, column 3, panel B.
22Note that the lag structure is now di¤erent from that in table 3, which explains the di¤erent coe¢ cients.
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Combining the results in tables 4 and 5, one possible interpretation is that the resource wind-
fall has resulted in an increase in non-administrative sta¤ and in capital spending, mainly within
education and infrastructure. In the analysis below, we will therefore pay particular attention to
analyzing whether these spending booms have resulted in actual improvements "on the ground".
5.1.3 Local GDP
The rst such assessment is found in table 6 where we analyze the relative impact of the windfall
on district levels of GDP. In our theoretical framework, we proposed that increases in public goods
should a¤ect labor productivity with a lag and hence have a delayed positive e¤ect on total GDP
even outside the resource sector. It should also be kept in mind that districts obtaining the windfall
typically had a higher level of GDP even before the reform.
Column 1 shows that total GDP increases very markedly two periods after the windfall. Column
3 shows that this e¤ect is indeed very strong in the non-oil sectors of the district economies. 100-
dollar resource windfalls in t  2 and t  1 increases district non-oil GDP by as much as 340 USD
in year t. Even the estimate in panel B, column 3 (2.78) suggests a GDP growth that is equivalent
to about 1/4 of the initial mean. This dramatic e¤ect is probably the most surprising result of our
study.23
Table 6
In table 7, we try to reach a more complete understanding of which sectors lead this very strong
GDP e¤ect. Column 1 indicates that the strongest e¤ect by far is found in agriculture. The net
e¤ect of the two lagged windfalls in panel B is an increase of 128 USD (equivalent to a 36 percent
increase compared to the total value of agricultural production). In manufacturing, there appears to
be a crowding-out e¤ect of windfalls from one period back but a positive e¤ect after two periods but
the e¤ects are not jointly signicant (panel B, column 2). Also hotels and restaurants experience a
distinct boom as a result of the windfall, although it is much smaller in percentage terms than in
agriculture.
Table 7
Combining the results so far, we have demonstrated increased spending on infrastructure, cap-
ital and sta¤, as well as a drastic increase in GDP led by the agricultural sector. One potential
explanation to these facts could be that the windfalls were largely spent on materials and personnel
employed to work on infrastructure that benetted the rural countrysides of Sumatra and Kali-
23Note that this e¤ect should not be interpreted as a local scal multiplier since such multipliers estimate the e¤ect
of government spending rather than revenue on GDP.
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mantan. The most obvious type of infrastructure is local roads.24 Did these actually improve as a
result of the increased spending?25
In table 8, we have compiled some evidence on the net e¤ect of resouce windfalls on the actual
quality of local roads in our sample districts. The results indicate that the share of roads with
asphalt has increased by about 10 percent (18 percent relative to the mean) as a result of the windfall
treatment. The share with asphalt and gravel has also increased. On the other hand, estimates for
the share of roads in good, or even fair, conditions are more mixed: the comtemporaneous e¤ect
is positive and large (but imprecisely estimated), whiled the lagged estimates are negative (and
marginally signicant). While the two sets of results are not easily interpreted in combination, note
that data on the share of roads with asphalt (and gravel) are available for four waves (2002, 2005,
2008, 2011), while data for the share of roads in good (or fair) conditions are available only for two
waves (2002, 2008). Hence, the rst set of estimates might be more reliable than the second.
Table 8
5.2 Village level
One of the clearest results from the analysis of spending patterns in table 4 was that education
expenditures increased one year after a resource windfall. A 100-dollar windfall resulted in about
10 USD per capita trickling down to schools. But does this money actually lead to observed
improvements in the villages of each district?
In this section, we exploit village level data to analyze whether the resource revenue resulted in
more schooling facilities in the villages. As before, our sample contains villages in districts close to
the border between provinces that received the windfalls and those that did not. Our results are
shown in table 9, where the dependent variable is a binary dummy for whether there is a primary,
a junior high, or a senior high school in the village.
Table 9
Column 1 indicates that the probability of nding a primary school in a village increased by
2.8 percent as a result of a 100-dollar windfall on district level. Column 2 shows a similar e¤ect
for junior high schools: the probability of nding a junior high school in a village increased by
4.3 percent following a 100-dollar windfall. No robust results of the windfall can be traced for the
presence of a senior high school in the villages.
24See Casaburi, Glennerster and Suri (2013), and references therein, for evidence on the e¤ect of rural roads on
development.
25Note that our theoretical discussion incorporates the possibility that a substantial portion of expenditures might
disappear in the hands of corrupt public o¢ cials. Olkens (2007) study of road construction on Java showed that
about 25 percent of allocated funds went missing, probably due to local capture.
22
Since junior high schools are much more rare than primary schools in villages, the relative
magnitudes are very di¤erent. The e¤ect for primary schools correspond to a 3.2 percent increase
relative to the mean (0.865), while the e¤ect for junior high schools correspond to a 14 percent
increase relative to the mean (0.303). This is consistent with district governments rightly targeting
disproportionately junior high school education, where enrollment is relatively low, rather than
primary school education, where enrollment is nearly universal.
5.3 Household level
5.3.1 Schooling
In this section, we use household data on invidual level outcomes. We saw from tables 4-5 that
district spending on education and on non-administrative sta¤ had increased as a result of the
windfall. Table 9 showed that the presence of primary and junior high schools increased in the
villages that received a windfall. Are these improvements also reected in schooling choices and
outcomes on household level?
In table 10, we show the impact of the windfall on school enrollment and completion in primary,
junior high, and senior high school.26 The sample includes all children in the relevant ages in our
included districts. In, for instance, column 1, we analyze primary school enrollment among 111,280
children aged 7-12. This level is actually mandatory for all children in Indonesia, as indicated by
the very high mean (98.5 percent were enrolled before the reform). Still, the standard resource
windfall of 100 USD appears to have resulted in an increase of about 0.8 percent in primary school
enrollment and about 1.5 percent increase in primary school completion.
Table 10
Also junior high school is mandatory, according to a law from 1994.27 However, enrollment
before the reform was only 57.7 percent. The coe¢ cients for enrollment are insignicant but the
impact on completion is positive and signicant. The standard windfall size increases junior high
school completion by about 4 percent, which corresponds to a 7.3 percent increase relative to the
mean (0.518). This e¤ect is roughly of the same magnitude as implied by the coe¢ cients for senior
high school enrollment (4.3 percent, i.e., 10.7 percent relative to the mean). Households in windfall
districts also experienced a signicant increase in senior high school completion (1.7 percent, i.e.,
5.6 percent relative to the mean).
The outcome variable in column 7 provides a summary statistic for education; years of schooling.
Among children and youth aged 10-22, a 100-dollar windfall resulted in an increse in about 0.13
26Pupils in Indonesia typically graduate from primary school at age 12, from junior high school at age 15 and from
senior high school at age 18.
27Senior high school was not mandatory during the period covered by our study but became mandatory in 2013
(Jakarta Post, 2013).
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years of eduction, which corresponds to a 1.7 percent increase relative to the mean (7.57 years).
Even more importantly perhaps, column 8 has an actual vital skill as the outcome variable; literacy
among young 180,000 individuals. The sum of lags in panel B implies that lagged windfalls increased
literacy by roughly 2 percent, equivalent to about 3600 individuals. In total, it therefore seems as if
the incresed spending on education also resulted in improvements in actual outcomes on individual
level.
5.3.2 Labor market
Tables 11-12 show the impact on labor markets in terms of employment status and actual hours
worked. The only signicant e¤ect in table 11 is found in column 5, showing the linear probability
of employment in agriculture among 25-54 year old males (1.8 percent decrease, i.e., 3.1 percent
decrease relative to the mean). Interestingly, the net e¤ect of the windfall is negative on agricul-
tural employment. Combined with the previous result that value added in agriculture increased
substantially due to the windfall, a picture emerges of great labor productivity increases, possibly
due to important increases in public goods and services benetting agriculture. Column 8 further
suggests that some of the redundant male rural workers actually ended up as formal employees.
Table 11
The dependent variables in table 12 are the actual number of days and hours worked per week
among adult men and women. In the theoretical section, we discussed whether the likely increase
in labor demand emanating from the increase in labor productivity should be expected to be
accompanied by an increase in labor supply. Whereas the result of the windfall on working days
are not signicant in columns 1-2, quite interesting e¤ects appear in columns 3-4 of panel B. Both
men and women appear to increase the number of hours worked one period after a windfall but
then decrease hours worked after two years. The net e¤ect for men in column 4 is a negative and
signicant change in hours worked, whereas the net e¤ect on women is about 1 hour more work per
week. The results are consistent with an explanation where men choose to decrease labor supply
as a result of a wage increase since they already work a lot every week (on average 41.3 hours) and
hence should earn a relatively high amount. Women, who are less likely to work at all and who
worked less hours before the reform, choose instead to increase their labor supply somewhat.
Table 12
5.3.3 Household consumption
Finally, in table 13, we investigate the impact of resource windfalls on household consumption
expenditures. In our model, as well as in most other macro models, individuals get utility from the
discounted sum of lifetime consumption. Hence, the impact on household consumption should be a
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very important indicator of the welfare gains of the reform. In the theoretical section, we suggested
that whereas wages and thus household incomes most likely increased due to labor productivity
improvements, household expenditures might not increase dramatically if individuals viewed the
windfall as temporary and had good options for saving.
Table 13
The total e¤ects on household expenditure in columns 1-3 certainly seem to imply a fairly strong
increase, although the estimates are not signicant in panel B. Interestingly, it turns out that the
increase in expenditure derives mainly from the increase in non-food consumption. The sum of lags
in column 5, panel B imply that 100-dollar windfalls in years t 1 and t 2 gives rise to a signicant
net increase in non-food consumption of 67 dollars. This increase is equivalent to a rise by about
19 percent compared to the pre-reform mean. Furthermore, judging by the parameters, most of the
windfall appears to be consumed in the short term rather than being saved. We leave it for future
research to investigate this relationship further. The main tendency of a boom in consumption,
and thus also in standards of living, is however very clear.
6 Discussion
Although we think our results raises several interesting questions of interpretation, we will mainly
focus on four aspects: i) The ypaper e¤ect, ii) the large increase in regional GDP, iii) the improve-
ments in education, and iv) overall interpretation and the e¤ect on welfare.
To start with, our results clearly indicate a ypaper e¤ect. A 100 USD resource windfall leads
to a contemporaneous increase of 93 USD in total revenue, and a total 74 USD increase over a two
years period (thanks to the partial reduction in inter-governmental transfers). Total expenditure
increases by 67 USD after one year and 76 USD over the same two years period, which suggests that
the local government spent all additional revenue. Consistent with this, local tax revenue revenue
does not respond to the resource windfall. Hence, it appears that money tended to stick pretty
rmly at local governments.
Second, how can we explain the very strong lagged e¤ect on regional GDP per capita? The result
is even more striking considering that treated districts had substantially higher incomes already be-
fore the reform. On the basis of our theoretical framework, we propose the following interpretation.
The windfall revenue boosted education and infrastructure spending and our objective measures
of road quality suggest a clear improvement. Although we do not know the detailed allocation of
the infrastructure budget, our conjecture is that it also helped to improve other important parts
of the logistical network. In particular, the very strong increase in agricultural production might
potentially have been partly caused by the improvements in rural infrastructure. Still, the mag-
nitude of the e¤ects in table 6 are extraordinary (GDP increases by a factor of 2.7) and calls for
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further work. They also stand in sharp constrast to some results reported in the literature on the
resource curse where extra oil money sometimes even lead to lower GDP growth. Considering that
treated districts had a much higher pre-reform income, we should however be cautious about our
interpretations of these results.
Third, our ndings indicate that much of the windfall from the reform was spent on education.
The increased spending resulted in more junior high schools on village levels and an almost 15
percentage point higher rate of junior high school completion. Perhaps the most important results
in terms of actual human capital improvements were probably that overall schooling increased with
0.14 years and that literacy increased by about 2 percent. This can be compared with the results
from Brazil reported in Litschig and Morrison (2013) of a 0.3 extra years of education and a 4
percent increase in literacy. The investments in education should have a positive e¤ect on Sumatra
and Kalimantan districts in the longer term.
In order to interpret the magnitude of these e¤ects, we can also compute the marginal cost of
an additional year of schooling implied by these estimates. We know that a 100 USD increase in
resource revenues led to a 7.5 USD increase in education spending per capita (Table 4, Column
2). Assuming this spending benetted primarily young people between 10 and 22 years old, which
constitute about 28 percent of the population, the increase in education spending amounts to 27
USD per school-aged individual. We also know that the same revenue shock led to a 0.14 increase
in years of schooling (Table 10, Column 7), i.e., for example, one out of seven pupils completed
an additional year of schooling. The implied marginal cost of this additional year of schooling is
therefore USD 27/0.14=193 USD. We can compare this cost with the average cost of schooling
implied by the data. The average annual education spending per capita is 0.385, i.e., 38.5 USD
(Table 4, Column 2). Assuming again that this is entirely spent on pupils aged 10-22, the average
cost of a year of schooling ranges from 137 USD and 220 USD.28
The similarity of the marginal cost to the average cost not only suggests that our estimates
are plausible, but also suggests that the additional education funds, which the resource windfalls
generated, might not have been embezzled on a large scale.
Fourth, our theoretical framework suggests that whereas (unobserved) wages, mainly in agricul-
ture, should have been boosted as a result of the labor productivity increase, the lack of e¤ects in
terms of employment might be explained by a backward-bending or xed labor supply curve. Such
a shape of labor supply would strengthen the increase in wages from a rise in labor productivity.
This interpretation is consistent with the fact that household expenditures increased by substantial
amounts, in particular non-food consumption.
In summary, our results show that positive e¤ects from the 1999 reform can be observed through-
28The average cost of a year of schooling corresponds to 137 USD if we simply divide 38.5 USD by 0.28 (percentage
of pupils aged 10-22). It corresponds to 220 USD if we divide it further by 0.625, which could be a rough measure of
completed years of schooling for each started year of schooling (Litschig and Morrison 2013). The survey questionnaire
does not make clear whether it measures years or completed years of schooling.
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out our di¤erent observation points, from district revenues down to household level e¤ects. The
overall picture that emerges is one of oil money that sticks at local government but is then spent
on public goods which greatly boosts GDP and household consumption. In this simple sense, the
reform has certainly had clear positive e¤ects for the communities and our study do not show any
signs of a resource curse being present.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we study the impact of a scal decentralization programme in Indonesia that provided
districts in producing provinces with a greater share of resource revenues from oil and gas. We argue
that our research design with cross-border comparisons between districts in two natural-resource
rich regions makes it possible to analyze the new policy as a natural experiment. Our main research
question is whether the windfall in local government revenue actually led to an observed increase
in the provision of local public goods, such as education, on district, village and household level.
Our results suggest that a ypaper e¤ect was evident in the district governments, that spending
on education and infrastructure increased, resulting in more schools in villages, more high school
attendance, a higher literacy and better roads. The windfall appears to have caused a dramatic
increase in regional GDP which was led by a boost to agriculture. The increase in incomes is also
evident on household level where household expenditures increased a lot.
Overall, the 1999 scal decentralization reform thus displayed mainly positive e¤ects and no
symptoms of increased corruption or other pathologies associated with the resource curse. We be-
lieve the Indonesian scal decentralization program might provide poor, resource-abundant coun-
tries with an interesting policy experiment that has not previously been widely tested in countries
throughout the world.
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Center Province Districts Centre Province
Non-prod
Resources studied
Oil 100 0 0 84.5 3.1 6.2 6.2
Gas 100 0 0 69.5 6.1 12.2 12.2
Other resources
Mining, land rent 65 19 16 20 16 6.4 0
Mining, royalties 30 56 14 20 16 32 32
Forestry 55 30 15 20 16 32 32
Note: All numbers in the table are percentages. Source: World Bank (1994) and Law 25/1999.   
Producing
TABLE 1: ALLOCATION OF REVENUES FROM NATURAL RESOURCES
Producing
Before 2001 After 2001
Districts
obs mean s.d. obs mean s.d. obs mean s.d. obs mean s.d. obs mean s.d.
A) Revenue
Total Revenue 23 0,38 0,19 10 0,36 0,13 320 1,44 0,81 158 2,03 1,28 478 1,63 1,02
Grants 23 0,29 0,16 10 0,27 0,11 317 1,00 0,60 158 0,55 0,35 475 0,85 0,57
Resource Revenues 23 0,02 0,02 10 0,00 0,00 301 0,13 0,19 148 1,03 0,85 449 0,42 0,66
Tax Revenue Sharing 23 0,05 0,04 10 0,06 0,03 315 0,15 0,12 156 0,27 0,31 471 0,19 0,21
Local Tax Revenue 23 0,02 0,02 10 0,02 0,02 317 0,07 0,11 157 0,10 0,09 474 0,08 0,10
Other Revenue 9 0,00 0,01 5 0,02 0,01 308 0,12 0,10 148 0,16 0,19 456 0,13 0,14
B) Expenditure
B.1) Economic Categorization
Total Expenditure 21 0,41 0,18 11 0,28 0,18 287 1,40 0,82 143 1,91 1,42 430 1,57 1,08
Staff Expenditure N/A 284 0,61 0,32 143 0,59 0,37 427 0,61 0,33
Capital Expenditure N/A 283 0,43 0,40 142 0,75 0,80 425 0,54 0,59
Goods and Services Expenditure N/A 282 0,27 0,17 143 0,39 0,27 425 0,31 0,21
Other Expenditure N/A 276 0,10 0,07 139 0,19 0,15 415 0,13 0,11
B.2) Functional Categorization N/A
Administration N/A 216 0,44 0,37 112 0,67 0,55 328 0,52 0,45
Education N/A 264 0,40 0,22 131 0,35 0,21 395 0,39 0,22
Infrastructure N/A 261 0,30 0,28 131 0,54 0,69 392 0,38 0,47
Housing and Urban Infrastructure N/A 170 0,03 0,06 78 0,09 0,20 248 0,05 0,12
C) Local GDP
Including Oil and Gas 23 6,21 3,05 11 18,13 12,13 297 9,08 4,37 145 21,77 11,60 442 13,24 9,61
Excluding Oil and Gas 23 5,93 2,54 11 9,25 4,10 297 8,35 3,68 145 14,81 7,55 442 10,47 6,08
Agriculture 23 2,29 0,86 11 3,74 2,21 297 2,80 1,23 145 5,35 4,03 442 3,64 2,79
Manufacturing 23 0,82 1,00 11 4,21 7,33 297 1,12 1,35 145 4,70 6,66 442 2,29 4,31
Trade, Retail, Hotels and Restaurants 23 0,98 0,48 11 1,69 2,46 297 1,26 0,63 145 1,95 1,99 442 1,49 1,29
D) Roads
Share with Asphalt 21 0,60 0,21 9 0,46 0,21 124 0,58 0,22 60 0,48 0,24 184 0,55 0,23
Share with Asphalt or Gravel 21 0,81 0,15 9 0,70 0,16 124 0,81 0,17 60 0,77 0,17 184 0,80 0,17
Share in Good Conditions 19 0,28 0,14 6 0,17 0,05 52 0,20 0,15 24 0,23 0,24 76 0,21 0,18
Share in Good or Fair Conditions 19 0,53 0,14 6 0,40 0,08 52 0,41 0,16 24 0,53 0,20 76 0,45 0,18
Observations 24 12 332 160 492
Note: District level data from Ministry of Finance and World Bank. Revenue, expenditure and local GDP indicators are in million IDR (i.e., 100 USD) and constant prices.
TABLE 2A
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL
TREATMENTCONTROL TOTALCONTROL TREATMENT
YEAR >=2001YEAR = 2000
obs mean s.d. obs mean s.d. obs mean s.d.
Education infrastructures
Primary School in the village 16272 0,84 0,37 6751 0,95 0,21 23023 0,87 0,34
Junior High School in the village 16272 0,26 0,44 6751 0,40 0,49 23023 0,30 0,46
Senior High School in the village 16272 0,13 0,33 6751 0,18 0,38 23023 0,14 0,35
Observations 16272 6751 23023
Schooling
Primary school, enrolled (7-12 years) 91224 0,99 0,12 45256 0,98 0,13 136480 0,98 0,12
Primary school, completed (12-15) 57725 0,65 0,48 28507 0,65 0,48 86232 0,65 0,48
Junior high school, enrolled (12-15) 58020 0,58 0,49 28692 0,58 0,49 86712 0,58 0,49
Junior high school, completed (15-18) 54542 0,52 0,50 26735 0,52 0,50 81277 0,52 0,50
Senior high school, enrolled (15-18) 54889 0,41 0,49 26943 0,41 0,49 81832 0,41 0,49
Senior high school, completed (18-22) 57443 0,31 0,46 29833 0,33 0,47 87276 0,31 0,46
Schooling, years of (10-22) 172968 7,58 2,90 86765 7,60 2,96 259733 7,58 2,92
Literacy (6-15) 148235 0,88 0,32 73448 0,88 0,32 221683 0,88 0,32
Employment
Working 509049 0,58 0,49 255579 0,52 0,50 764628 0,56 0,50
Working (25-54 years) 260839 0,78 0,42 133684 0,70 0,46 394523 0,75 0,43
Working, female (25-54) 130674 0,58 0,49 65645 0,43 0,49 196319 0,53 0,50
Working, male (25-54) 130165 0,97 0,16 68039 0,97 0,18 198204 0,97 0,17
Working in agriculture, male (25-54) 126551 0,58 0,49 65828 0,56 0,50 192379 0,57 0,49
Self-employed, male (25-54) 126551 0,63 0,48 65828 0,57 0,50 192379 0,61 0,49
Employed, male (25-54) 126551 0,28 0,45 65828 0,35 0,48 192379 0,30 0,46
Work days, female (25-54) 55558 5,63 1,56 20148 5,71 1,45 75706 5,65 1,53
Work days, male (25-54) 96022 5,95 1,24 49947 6,01 1,17 145969 5,97 1,22
Work hours, female (25-54) 55558 33,60 15,35 20147 33,97 16,31 75705 33,70 15,61
Work hours, male (25-54) 96020 41,07 14,59 49946 41,46 15,35 145966 41,20 14,85
Observations 569472 285627 855099
PANEL B: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
TABLE 2B
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AT THE VILLAGE, HOUSEHOLD AND INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
CONTROL TREATMENT TOTAL
PANEL A: VILLAGE LEVEL
Household Expenditure
Average monthly expenditure, total 141334 948 851 615 730 68738 1 136 625 825 427 210072 1 010 293 696 971
Average monthly expenditure, food 141334 635 922 324 350 68738 703 929 380 487 210072 658 175 345 206
Average monthly expenditure, non-food 141334 312 929 400 084 68738 432 696 576 028 210072 352 118 468 422
Observations 141334 68738 210072
PANEL C: HOUSEHOLD LEVEL
Note: Village level data in Panel A come from PODES 2002, 2005, 2008; individual and household level data in Panel B and C come from Susenas 2001-
2009. "Work days" and "work hours" refer to the previous week. Average household expenditure measured in million IDR (i.e., 100 USD) at constant 
prices.
MODEL
VARIABLES TOTAL REVENUE GRANTS
TOTAL 
EXPENDITURE
OWN 
REVENUE
TOTAL 
REVENUE GRANTS
TOTAL 
EXPENDITURE
OWN 
REVENUE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RESOURCE REVENUES 0.926*** -0.080 0.354 0.043 0.207*** -0.057 0.073 0.031
(0.071) (0.080) (0.262) (0.028) (0.047) (0.036) (0.049) (0.020)
Mean 1.648 0.768 1.582 0.0824
R-squared 0.768 0.453 0.667 0.115 0.756 0.416 0.731 0.151
Observations 449 446 403 445 449 446 403 445
Number of districts 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
RESOURCE REVENUES 0.957*** 0.091 -0.199 0.031 0.258*** 0.052 -0.000 0.019
(0.079) (0.068) (0.211) (0.040) (0.053) (0.039) (0.057) (0.026)
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES -0.034 -0.018 0.672*** 0.002 -0.015 -0.009 0.108** 0.003
(0.124) (0.070) (0.200) (0.024) (0.024) (0.034) (0.051) (0.016)
L2.RESOURCE REVENUES -0.188*** -0.301*** 0.095 0.022 -0.089*** -0.187*** -0.029 0.017
(0.051) (0.055) (0.274) (0.017) (0.023) (0.033) (0.052) (0.011)
Sum lags 0.735 -0.229 0.568 0.0553 0.154 -0.144 0.0790 0.0383
Sum lags se 0.162 0.113 0.353 0.0363 0.0573 0.0562 0.0792 0.0229
Sum lags p 9.47e-05 0.0517 0.119 0.139 0.0118 0.0158 0.327 0.106
Joint P 0 3.32e-06 0.0115 0.411 0.000215 3.73e-08 0.221 0.266
Main diff from sum lags p 0.109 0.00330 0.0159 0.318 0.00588 0.00218 0.182 0.260
Mean 1.646 0.755 1.577 0.0871
R-squared 0.758 0.559 0.654 0.111 0.790 0.545 0.723 0.135
Observations 361 358 332 359 361 358 332 359
Number of districts 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
TABLE 3: TOTAL REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE
Resource revenues are per capita and in constant (2005) prices. They are expressed in million IDR (i.e., 100 USD). Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the district level, using district boundaries as 
in 1993. All specifications include year fixed effects and district fixed effects. The sample period is 2001-2010. All outcomes are also expressed in per capita terms, constant (2005) prices and million IDR 
(i.e., 100 USD) unless otherwise specified.
LINEAR LOG-LINEAR
PANEL B: DYNAMICS
PANEL A: CONTEMPORANEOUS EFFECT
MODEL
VARIABLES ADMIN EDU-CATION INFRASTR. HOUSING ADMIN
EDU-
CATION INFRASTR. HOUSING
(1) (2) (3) (4) (8) (9) (10) (11)
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES -0.132 0.0907* 0.308 -0.0764 -0.0504 0.0567* 0.0705 -0.0535
(0.213) (0.0446) (0.182) (0.0840) (0.0754) (0.0316) (0.0777) (0.0575)
Mean 0.509 0.385 0.370 0.0463
R-squared 0.195 0.618 0.414 0.278 0.280 0.600 0.499 0.297
Observations 300 371 368 242 300 371 368 242
Number of districts 45 49 49 49 45 49 49 49
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES -0.116 0.109* 0.174 -0.0705 -0.0365 0.0672 0.0312 -0.0498
(0.168) (0.0582) (0.168) (0.0596) (0.0569) (0.0414) (0.0893) (0.0378)
L2.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.00155 -0.0341 0.117 -0.0360 0.00178 -0.0217 0.0220 -0.0178
(0.0819) (0.0403) (0.171) (0.0639) (0.0391) (0.0296) (0.0644) (0.0437)
Sum lags -0.114 0.0750 0.292 -0.107 -0.0347 0.0455 0.0532 -0.0676
Sum lags se 0.229 0.0478 0.199 0.117 0.0837 0.0345 0.0795 0.0750
Sum lags p 0.623 0.128 0.154 0.368 0.681 0.198 0.509 0.375
Joint P 0.659 0.183 0.347 0.433 0.746 0.277 0.787 0.341
Mean 0.498 0.379 0.357 0.0443
R-squared 0.169 0.610 0.384 0.298 0.244 0.591 0.462 0.320
Observations 279 349 346 238 279 349 346 238
Number of districts 45 48 48 48 45 48 48 48
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
TABLE 4: LOCAL GOV EXPENDITURE (BY FUNCTION)
Resource revenues are per capita and in constant (2005) prices. They are expressed in million IDR (i.e., 100 USD). Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the district level, using 
district boundaries as in 1993. All specifications include year fixed effects and district fixed effects. The sample period is 2001-2010. All outcomes are also expressed in per capita 
terms, constant (2005) prices and million IDR (i.e., 100 USD) unless otherwise specified.
PANEL B: DYNAMICS
PANEL A: CONTEMPORANEOUS EFFECT
LOG-LINEARLINEAR
MODEL
VARIABLES TOTAL STAFF CAPITAL GOODS AND SERVICES OTHER EXP TOTAL STAFF CAPITAL
GOODS AND 
SERVICES OTHER EXP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.482** 0.114** 0.266* 0.0660* 0.0319 0.0438 0.0510*** 0.0328 0.0297 0.0247
(0.188) (0.0428) (0.131) (0.0367) (0.0215) (0.0454) (0.0183) (0.0550) (0.0200) (0.0176)
R-squared 0.687 0.707 0.537 0.351 0.184 0.726 0.747 0.636 0.373 0.200
Observations 397 397 394 395 385 397 397 394 395 385
Number of districts 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Mean 1.573 0.609 0.533 0.312 0.129
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.442** 0.0713 0.209 0.0916** 0.0567*** 0.0702 0.0340 0.0375 0.0496** 0.0463***
(0.203) (0.0449) (0.157) (0.0403) (0.0192) (0.0554) (0.0216) (0.0718) (0.0236) (0.0159)
L2.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.0336 0.0862*** 0.0194 -0.0133 -0.0404** -0.0428 0.0377*** -0.0327 -0.0125 -0.0336**
(0.191) (0.0303) (0.159) (0.0213) (0.0187) (0.0386) (0.0132) (0.0563) (0.0132) (0.0146)
Sum lags 0.476 0.157 0.228 0.0783 0.0164 0.0274 0.0717 0.00478 0.0371 0.0126
Sum lags se 0.219 0.0492 0.147 0.0376 0.0300 0.0520 0.0202 0.0608 0.0229 0.0239
Sum lags p 0.0380 0.00343 0.132 0.0466 0.590 0.602 0.00140 0.938 0.117 0.601
Joint P 0.0666 0.00526 0.252 0.0905 0.000990 0.382 0.00122 0.824 0.125 0.00106
Mean 1.544 0.599 0.518 0.308 0.128
R-squared 0.666 0.738 0.500 0.375 0.198 0.722 0.773 0.609 0.396 0.218
Observations 373 373 370 371 365 373 373 370 371 365
Number of districts 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
TABLE 5: LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
Resource revenues are per capita and in constant (2005) prices. They are expressed in million IDR (i.e., 100 USD). Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the district level, using district boundaries as in 1993. All specifications include year fixed effects 
and district fixed effects. The sample period is 2001-2010. All outcomes are also expressed in per capita terms, constant (2005) prices and million IDR (i.e., 100 USD) unless otherwise specified.
PANEL B: DYNAMICS
PANEL A: CONTEMPORANEOUS EFFECT
LOG-LINEARLINEAR
MODEL
VARIABLES GRDP INCL. OIL
MINING/ 
QUARRYING
GRDP EXCL. 
OIL
GRDP INCL. 
OIL
MINING/ 
QUARRYING
GRDP EXCL. 
OIL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES 2.817 1.729 2.678*** 0.0764 0.119 0.114*
(1.873) (1.383) (0.872) (0.0696) (0.0884) (0.0567)
Mean 13.44 3.369 10.57
R-squared 0.458 0.166 0.522 0.599 0.332 0.652
Observations 399 399 399 399 399 399
Number of districts 49 49 49 49 49 49
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.540 0.743 0.624 0.0544 0.0704 0.0628
(1.536) (1.092) (0.498) (0.0579) (0.0552) (0.0468)
L2.RESOURCE REVENUES 3.277** 1.068 2.783*** 0.0225 0.0351 0.0779**
(1.307) (0.743) (0.946) (0.0472) (0.0905) (0.0358)
Sum lags 3.817 1.811 3.407 0.0769 0.106 0.141
Sum lags se 2.363 1.726 1.059 0.0924 0.122 0.0714
Sum lags p 0.117 0.303 0.00327 0.412 0.394 0.0587
Joint P 0.0494 0.305 0.0120 0.647 0.452 0.107
Mean 13.49 3.324 10.58
R-squared 0.490 0.167 0.563 0.601 0.325 0.662
Observations 367 367 367 367 367 367
Number of districts 47 47 47 47 47 47
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29
Resource revenues are per capita and in constant (2005) prices. They are expressed in million IDR (i.e., 100 USD). Standard errors (in brackets) 
clustered at the district level, using district boundaries as in 1993. All specifications include year fixed effects and district fixed effects. The sample 
period is 2001-2010. All outcomes are also expressed in per capita terms, constant (2005) prices and million IDR (i.e., 100 USD) unless otherwise 
specified.
LOG-LINEARLINEAR
TABLE 6: EFFECT ON GROSS REGIONAL DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GRDP)
PANEL A: CONTEMPORANEOUS EFFECT
PANEL B: DYNAMICS
MODEL
VARIABLES AGRICULTURE MANUFACT.
TRADE/ 
HOTEL/RES
T.
AGRICULTU
RE MANUFACT.
TRADE/ 
HOTEL/RES
T.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.912* 0.0570 0.141* 0.128** 0.0369 0.0569*
(0.457) (0.273) (0.0776) (0.0619) (0.0513) (0.0318)
Mean 3.588 2.393 1.532
R-squared 0.384 0.165 0.441 0.435 0.378 0.538
Observations 399 399 399 399 399 399
Number of districts 49 49 49 49 49 49
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.287 -0.430 0.0214 0.0769 0.00743 0.0217
(0.178) (0.293) (0.0776) (0.0474) (0.0382) (0.0276)
L2.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.998* 0.904 0.218** 0.0889** 0.0662 0.0576**
(0.522) (0.532) (0.0867) (0.0380) (0.0517) (0.0237)
Sum lags 1.284 0.474 0.239 0.166 0.0736 0.0794
Sum lags se 0.629 0.408 0.0941 0.0777 0.0669 0.0390
Sum lags p 0.0508 0.256 0.0168 0.0416 0.281 0.0512
Joint P 0.139 0.228 0.0317 0.0813 0.449 0.0629
Mean 3.547 2.476 1.559
R-squared 0.415 0.189 0.469 0.446 0.391 0.563
Observations 367 367 367 367 367 367
Number of districts 47 47 47 47 47 47
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29
Resource revenues are per capita and in constant (2005) prices. They are expressed in million IDR (i.e., 100 USD). Standard errors (in brackets) 
clustered at the district level, using district boundaries as in 1993. All specifications include year fixed effects and district fixed effects. The sample 
period is 2001-2010. All outcomes are also expressed in per capita terms, constant (2005) prices and million IDR (i.e., 100 USD) unless otherwise 
specified.
TABLE 7: EFFECT ON GROSS REGIONAL DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GRDP)
LINEAR LOG-LINEAR
PANEL A: CONTEMPORANEOUS EFFECT
PANEL B: DYNAMICS
MODEL
VARIABLES
SHARE 
WITH 
ASPHALT
SHARE 
WITH 
ASPHALT/ 
GRAVEL
SHARE IN 
GOOD 
CONDITION
SHARE IN 
GOOD/ 
FAIR 
CONDITION
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.099*** 0.058** 0.129 0.156
(0.026) (0.027) (0.171) (0.244)
Mean 0.545 0.797 0.208 0.451
R-squared 0.342 0.375 0.091 0.056
Observations 165 165 70 70
Number of districts 49 49 44 44
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.069** 0.024 -0.093* -0.183*
(0.025) (0.027) (0.050) (0.103)
L2.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.033** 0.027 -0.048 -0.058
(0.014) (0.016) (0.031) (0.069)
Sum lags 0.102 0.0510 -0.141 -0.241
Sum lags se 0.0223 0.0207 0.0774 0.145
Sum lags p 8.98e-05 0.0204 0.0792 0.108
Joint P 0.000145 0.0168 0.197 0.221
Mean 0.563 0.806 0.220 0.473
R-squared 0.366 0.391 0.072 0.165
Observations 146 146 59 59
Number of districts 48 48 41 41
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29
PANEL A: CONTEMPORANEOUS EFFECT
PANEL B: DYNAMICS
LINEAR
TABLE 8: ROADS
Resource revenues are per capita and in constant (2005) prices. They are expressed in million IDR (i.e., 100 
USD). Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the district level, using district boundaries as in 1993. All 
specifications include year fixed effects and district fixed effects. The sample period is 2002,2005,2008,2011 
(Col.1-2) and 2002,2008 (Col.3 and 4). All dependent variables are binary indicators.
MODEL
VARIABLES
PRIMARY 
SCHOOL IN 
VILLAGE
JUNIOR HIGH 
SCHOOL IN 
VILLAGE
SENIOR HIGH 
SCHOOL IN 
VILLAGE
(1) (2) (3)
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.028** 0.043 0.033
(0.012) (0.029) (0.021)
Mean 0.865 0.303 0.142
R-squared 0.301 0.256 0.239
Observations 20,263 20,263 20,263
Number of clusters 29 29 29
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES -0.000 0.005 -0.017
(0.011) (0.031) (0.037)
L2.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.022
(0.006) (0.012) (0.014)
Sum lags 0.0344 0.0491 0.00596
Sum lags se 0.0122 0.0360 0.0405
Sum lags p 0.00879 0.184 0.884
Joint P 9.86e-06 0.00395 0.231
Mean 0.883 0.310 0.145
R-squared 0.294 0.258 0.245
Observations 16,722 16,722 16,722
Number of clusters 29 29 29
TABLE 9: EDUCATION OUTCOMES: SCHOOLS
LINEAR
PANEL A: CONTEMPORANEOUS EFFECT
PANEL B: DYNAMICS
Resource revenues are per capita and in constant (2005) prices. They are expressed in million IDR (i.e., 
100 USD). Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the district level, using district boundaries as in 
1993. All specifications include year fixed effects, district fixed effects, and control for geographical 
characteristics (whether the village is located, separately, on the coast, in a valley, or in a slope; whether 
the village is crossed by a river), for urban status, and control flexibly for population (in level, squared 
and cubic). The sample period is 2002,2005,2008. Data at the village level. Dependent variables in all 
columns are binary indicators.
MODEL
VARIABLES
PRIMARY 
ENROLL-
MENT 7-12
PRIMARY 
COMPLE-
TION 12-15
JUNIOR 
ENROLL-
MENT 12-15
JUNIOR 
COMPLE-
TION 15-18
SENIOR 
ENROLL-
MENT 15-18
SENIOR 
COMPLE-
TION 18-22
SCHOOL-
ING  10-22
LITE-
RACY      
6-15
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.0085*** 0.0150 0.0199 0.0379*** 0.0431*** 0.0176* 0.1303** 0.0159
(0.0017) (0.0138) (0.0127) (0.0104) (0.0115) (0.0102) (0.0624) (0.0096)
Mean 0.985 0.649 0.577 0.518 0.403 0.311 7.567 0.882
R-squared 0.0046 0.0199 0.0343 0.0475 0.0720 0.0684 0.0366 0.0084
Observations 121,497 76,742 77,179 72,434 72,947 77,981 231,403 197,378
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.0087*** 0.0136 0.0204* 0.0439*** 0.0434*** -0.0017 0.1265 0.0080
(0.0021) (0.0108) (0.0103) (0.0149) (0.0129) (0.0102) (0.0867) (0.0083)
L2.RESOURCE REVENUES -0.0010 0.0046 -0.0007 -0.0116 -0.0037 0.0330** 0.0155 0.0117**
(0.0018) (0.0126) (0.0116) (0.0161) (0.0166) (0.0137) (0.0851) (0.0047)
Sum lags 0.00770 0.0183 0.0197 0.0323 0.0397 0.0313 0.142 0.0197
Sum lags se 0.00151 0.0177 0.0151 0.0104 0.0115 0.0117 0.0588 0.00991
Sum lags p 2.15e-05 0.311 0.202 0.00445 0.00177 0.0125 0.0225 0.0569
Joint P 4.82e-05 0.452 0.163 0.00252 0.000340 0.0328 0.0606 0.0485
Mean 0.984 0.646 0.574 0.512 0.397 0.307 7.553 0.882
R-squared 0.0045 0.0204 0.0351 0.0472 0.0720 0.0684 0.0381 0.0088
Observations 111,280 70,094 70,500 66,349 66,822 71,498 211,903 180,535
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
PANEL A: CONTEMPORANEOUS EFFECT
LINEAR
TABLE 10: EDUCATION OUTCOMES
PANEL B: DYNAMICS
Resource revenues are per capita and in constant (2005) prices. They are expressed in million IDR (i.e., 100 USD). Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the district level, using district 
boundaries as in 1993. All specifications include year fixed effects and district fixed effects. The sample period is 2001-2009. Data at the individual level. Dependent variables in Col. 1-6 and 
8 are binary indicators. Dependent variable in Col. 7 is number of years of schooling.
MODEL
VARIABLES WORKING WORKING 25-54
WORKING 
25-54 
FEMALE
WORKIN
G 25-54 
MALE
AGRICULTUR
AL JOB 25-54 
MALE
SELF-
EMPLOYED 25-
54 MALE
EMPLOYEE 
25-54 MALE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.0050 0.0047 0.0180 -0.0050 -0.0180* -0.0014 0.0122
(0.0078) (0.0074) (0.0161) (0.0038) (0.0106) (0.0101) (0.0095)
Mean 0.557 0.749 0.525 0.971 0.567 0.604 0.307
R-squared 0.0234 0.0361 0.1100 0.0075 0.1478 0.0801 0.0973
Observations 681,104 351,907 174,912 176,995 171,781 171,781 171,781
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0064 -0.0048 -0.0280** 0.0217 -0.0110
(0.0080) (0.0084) (0.0167) (0.0059) (0.0108) (0.0158) (0.0091)
L2.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.0021 0.0026 0.0091 -0.0008 0.0065 -0.0323* 0.0302***
(0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0122) (0.0053) (0.0083) (0.0184) (0.0088)
Sum lags 0.00328 0.00252 0.0155 -0.00555 -0.0215 -0.0107 0.0192
Sum lags se 0.00924 0.00923 0.0201 0.00359 0.0125 0.0150 0.0109
Sum lags p 0.725 0.787 0.447 0.133 0.0964 0.481 0.0899
Joint P 0.914 0.902 0.695 0.316 0.0455 0.219 0.00696
Mean 0.554 0.746 0.520 0.971 0.567 0.605 0.307
R-squared 0.0237 0.0365 0.1111 0.0077 0.1538 0.0839 0.1029
Observations 621,412 320,694 159,450 161,244 156,491 156,491 156,491
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
LINEAR
TABLE 11: EMPLOYMENT STATUS
PANEL A: CONTEMPORANEOUS EFFECT
PANEL B: DYNAMICS
Resource revenues are per capita and in constant (2005) prices. They are expressed in million IDR (i.e., 100 USD). Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the district 
level, using district boundaries as in 1993. All specifications include year fixed effects and district fixed effects. The sample period is 2001-2010 unless otherwise 
specified. All dependent variables are binary indicators.
MODEL
VARIABLES WORK DAYS 25-54 FEMALE
WORK DAYS 
25-54 MALE
WORK HOURS 
25-54 FEMALE
WORK HOURS 
25-54 MALE
WORK DAYS 
25-54 
FEMALE
WORK DAYS 
25-54 MALE
WORK HOURS 
25-54 FEMALE
WORK HOURS 
25-54 MALE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.1187 -0.0085 1.7126 0.4314 0.0139 0.0008 0.0427 0.0097
(0.0944) (0.0538) (1.1856) (0.9067) (0.0195) (0.0085) (0.0420) (0.0235)
Mean 5.664 5.971 33.81 41.30
R-squared 0.0362 0.0256 0.0431 0.0684 0.0397 0.0280 0.0383 0.0659
Observations 69,188 134,237 69,187 134,234 67,408 132,725 67,403 132,722
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES 0.1485 -0.0061 2.6048** 1.1493 0.0215 -0.0000 0.0847** 0.0272
(0.0927) (0.0635) (1.2234) (0.9787) (0.0157) (0.0099) (0.0341) (0.0291)
L2.RESOURCE REVENUES -0.0911 -0.0131 -1.5821 -1.2392** -0.0251 0.0009 -0.0702* -0.0276
(0.0843) (0.0497) (1.0253) (0.5525) (0.0200) (0.0086) (0.0370) (0.0227)
Sum lags 0.0574 -0.0192 1.023 -0.0899 -0.00364 0.000858 0.0145 -0.000421
Sum lags se 0.109 0.0572 1.324 1.061 0.0219 0.00975 0.0478 0.0276
Sum lags p 0.604 0.739 0.446 0.933 0.869 0.931 0.765 0.988
Joint P 0.232 0.931 0.0857 0.0707 0.273 0.994 0.0206 0.447
Mean 5.671 5.975 33.83 41.31
R-squared 0.0373 0.0261 0.0426 0.0696 0.0411 0.0287 0.0373 0.0669
Observations 65,140 126,664 65,139 126,661 63,482 125,273 63,478 125,270
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Resource revenues are per capita and in constant (2005) prices. They are expressed in million IDR (i.e., 100 USD). Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the district level, using district 
boundaries as in 1993. All specifications include year fixed effects and district fixed effects. The sample period is 2001-2009. Data at the individual level (Susenas). All dependent variables are 
count variables.
LINEAR LOG-LINEAR
TABLE 12: LABOR SUPPLY
PANEL B: DYNAMICS
PANEL A: CONTEMPORANEOUS EFFECT
MODEL
VARIABLES TOTAL TOTAL (TRIMMED)
TOTAL 
(WINSORED) FOOD NON-FOOD TOTAL
TOTAL 
(TRIMMED)
TOTAL 
(WINSORED) FOOD NON-FOOD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES 89,435*** 68,444** 76,876** 31,458 57,977*** 0.0519 0.0507 0.0510 0.0333 0.0706
(30,704) (30,723) (30,820) (24,244) (14,063) (0.0315) (0.0316) (0.0315) (0.0334) (0.0420)
Mean 1 015 000 981 285 999 752 659 991 355 479
R-squared 0.139 0.158 0.174 0.088 0.133 0.174 0.160 0.175 0.094 0.259
Observations 187,354 183,543 187,354 187,354 187,354 187,354 183,543 187,354 187,354 187,354
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
L1.RESOURCE REVENUES 46,834 33,863 38,377 17,952 28,883 0.0377 0.0373 0.0377 0.0277 0.0638*
(30,132) (27,138) (28,312) (16,849) (20,796) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0268) (0.0267) (0.0367)
L2.RESOURCE REVENUES 45,844 31,582 38,254 7,284 38,560 0.00650 0.00475 0.00497 -0.00526 -0.00453
(36,399) (22,807) (29,474) (17,356) (26,612) (0.0239) (0.0213) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0395)
Sum lags 92 678 65 446 76 631 25 236 67 443 0.0442 0.0420 0.0426 0.0224 0.0593
Sum lags se 36 339 33 319 34 908 28 273 20 135 0.0372 0.0364 0.0369 0.0412 0.0488
Sum lags p 0.0165 0.0595 0.0366 0.380 0.00233 0.244 0.258 0.258 0.591 0.234
Joint P 0.0475 0.158 0.108 0.573 0.00679 0.381 0.396 0.384 0.476 0.233
Mean 1 013 000 978 776 997 383 659 448 353 741
R-squared 0.146 0.165 0.181 0.091 0.142 0.180 0.166 0.182 0.097 0.267
Observations 174,999 171,404 174,999 174,999 174,999 174,999 171,404 174,999 174,999 174,999
Number of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
TABLE 13: AVERAGE MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE
Resource revenues are per capita and in constant (2005) prices. They are expressed in million IDR (i.e., 100 USD). Standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the district level, using district boundaries as in 1993. All specifications 
include year fixed effects and district fixed effects. The sample period is 2001-2009. Data at the household level (Susenas). All outcomes are also expressed in per capita terms, constant (2005) prices and million IDR (i.e., 100 
USD) unless otherwise specified. In order to deal with outlier, the dependent variable has been trimmed (Col. 2 and 7) and winsored (Col. 3 and 8). In both cases the thresholds were the top and bottom 1 percent.
PANEL A: CONTEMPORANEOUS EFFECT
PANEL B: DYNAMICS
LINEAR LOG-LINEAR
Figure 1: Borders between treatment (Riau, South Sumatra) and control areas (Northern Sumatra 
and Jambi) on Sumatra 
 
Note: The three dotted lines show the borders exploited in the empirical study between treatment and 
control areas. The northeastern dotted line is between Riau (treatment) and North Sumatra (control), the 
central line between Riau (treatment) and Jambi (control), and the southernmost line is between South 
Sumatra (treatment) and Jambi (control). The black lines show the borders to provinces not included in 
the study.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Border between treatment (East Kalimantan) and control areas (West, Central, and 
South Kalimantan) 
 
Note: The dotted lines show the borders exploited in the empirical study between the treatment area East 
Kalimantan and the control areas West, Central, and South Kalimantan.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Indonesian districts on Sumatra and Kalimantan included in the study 
 
 
Note: The dark blue districts received extra revenues from oil and gas after 1999 whereas the light-blue districts did not.  
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of resource revenues across treatment and control districts. 
 
Note: The figure shows density (number of districts) on the vertical axis and resource revenues per capita 
(in units of constant (2005) 100 USD) on the horizontal axis.   
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Figure 5: Evolution of district revenue and expenditure across treatment and control districts. 
 
Note: All revenue and expenditure indicators are per capita and in constant (2005) prices. They are 
expressed in million IDR (i.e., 100 USD). The figures show estimates (circles) and standard errors (vertical 
lines) from a Fixed Effect model including treatment indicator (1 if the district received oil and gas 
transfers), year FE and district FE. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
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C: LOCALLY MANAGED TAXES
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D: TOTAL GOV EXPENDITURE
Figure 6: Evolution of district GDP across treatment and control districts. 
 
Note: All revenue and expenditure indicators are per capita and in constant (2005) prices. They are 
expressed in million IDR (i.e., 100 USD). The figures show estimates (circles) and standard errors (vertical 
lines) from a Fixed Effect model including treatment indicator (1 if the district received oil and gas 
transfers), year FE and district FE. Standard errors clustered at the district level. 
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